1

Introduction
The successive accounting scandals and corporate failures of the early 2000s as well as the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis have led to a resurgence of interest in improving corporate governance (CG) practices in the U.S. and the world. 1 The renewed interest in CG has been accompanied by an increasing awareness of the social and environmental consequences of corporate activities.
The resulting drive towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has galvanized global attention and achieved significant resonance in recent years.
The growing importance of both CG and CSR has also led to intense academic scrutiny of the CG-CSR nexus. Evidently, the relationship between CG and CSR critically hinges on the definition of CG. With the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, CG was initially viewed by financial economists as the mechanism through which the rights of external investors are protected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . However, broader definitions of CG have been advanced. For instance, the Cadbury (1992) committee offers a more expansive definition of CG as the mechanism though which companies are managed and controlled. More recent views on CG also note that the consequences of corporate actions are not confined to internal claimholders but also affect external stakeholders, the environment, society and the economy.
The latter view is consistent with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s principles on good CG which clearly refer to the effect of corporate actions on a wider group of stakeholders (OECD, 2004) . Claessens (2003) and Claessens and Yirtoglu (2012) adopt this all-encompassing view of CG and further argue that CSR constitutes an integral component of good CG.
In light of the increasing importance of CG and CSR, recent academic research has extensively examined the CG-CSR nexus (Mitchell, 2007; Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008) . In this paper, we build on the work of Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) to study the CG-CSR nexus in the context of the Lebanese banking sector. In specific, we conduct a qualitative comparative study of the opinions of Lebanese bank managers, banking authorities and a bank association on CG, CSR and the CG-CSR nexus. Given the nascent nature of CG and CSR in Lebanon, no existing studies examine the CSR-CG nexus in the Lebanese context or in the Lebanese banking sector, in specific. We believe that such an exploration is warranted as it would shed light on the practice of CG and CSR as well as the interplay between CG and CSR in a developing country context. Our study therefore contributes to the existing literature on the CG-CSR nexus but from a developing country perspective. In view of the dearth of studies on the CG-CSR nexus in Lebanon, we opt for an explorative approach given that such a research design provides extensive information on the relationship between CG and CSR. More specifically, we adopt a qualitative research design which involves conducting in-depth semistructured interviews and analyzing the results of a questionnaire administered to five banks and banking authorities' representatives. We employ a qualitative research design for two important motives: First, Boyce and Neale (2006) note that in-depth semi-structured interviews are an invaluable tool allowing researchers to shed light on different opinions. Second, our qualitative research design has the advantage of infrangibly exhuming the perceptions of the CSR and CG nexus of the banks and bank associations. Our main interest lies in examining whether differences in perspectives exist between bank managers and banking authorities (association) as they relate to their understanding of the nature of CG, CSR and the CSR-CG nexus.
The CG-CSR Nexus: Related Literature
We next review the existing studies on the CSR and CG nexus. The sizeable literatures on CG, CSR and the CG and CSR nexus force us to be selective in our review of the existing studies. We focus specifically on studies that directly tackle the CG-CSR nexus.
Management scholars have been increasingly interested in examining the complementarities between CG and CSR. Rudolph (2005) and Elkington (2006) note that an overlap in the terminologies and cross-connections between CSR, ethics, and CG exists. Carr and Outhwaite, (2011) argue that complementarities exist in the relationship between CG and CSR. Bhimani and Soonawalla (2005) note that CG, CSR and stakeholder value creation constitute an integral component of the corporate responsibilities continuum. In a similar vein, Beltratti (2005) argues that CG and CSR are complementary and notes that an effective CG framework coupled with CSR engagement result in improved financial performance. Along the same lines, Van den Berghe and Louche (2005) assert that CG and CSR derive from the same attributes which include honesty, transparency and accountability while Rudolph (2005) and Elkington (2006) emphasize the cross-connections between CSR, ethics and CG. Jensen (2002) and Aguilera et al. (2007) argue that both CG and CSR are expressions of a firm's moral and fiduciary responsibilities towards its stakeholders. The studies above indicate that an overlap exists between the definitions of CSR and CG. According to Benders and Van Veen (2001) , the increasing popularity of both CSR and CG generates some ambiguity in defining the confines of each. Other important contributions to the literature (Aguilera et al., 2006; Lea, 2004 ) also underscore the existence of complementarities between CG and CSR. In an attempt to conceptualize the relationship between CG, CSR and business ethics, Fassin and Van Rossem (2009) explore the distinctiveness and clarity in the perceptions that opinion leaders have concerning CG, CSR and business ethics, and the relationships that exist between them.
Two broad paradigms have emerged from the literature examining the CG-CSR nexus. One strand of the literature views CG as a foundation or pillar of CSR. That is, CG is an allencompassing concept under which CSR falls. Studies that fall into this strand of the literature include Sacconi (2006) , Luo (2006) , Aguilera et al. (2006) , Claessens (2003) , Carr and Outhwaite (2011), Claessens and Yirtoglu (2012) , Elkington (2006) and McCarthy and Puffer (2008) . In contrast to these studies, another strand of the literature gives CSR the "umbrella attribute" (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Basu and Palazzo, 2008) . Conley and Williams (2005) epitomize the latter view by referring to CSR as the "new governance" mechanism. Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath (2008) suggest that there is an increasing overlap between CG and CSR and provide three frameworks through which to understand the CG-CSR nexus: (1) corporate governance as a pillar of corporate social responsibility, (2) corporate social responsibility as a dimension of corporate governance, and (3) corporate governance and corporate social responsibility as part of a continuum.
Some empirical evidence on the CSR-CG nexus also exists. Recent empirical studies formulate four testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between CG and CSR. The first hypothesis, developed by Barnea and Rubin (2010) , uses Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory to argue that top managers have a tendency to over-invest in CSR in order to build an image of themselves as "good global citizens". Jo and Harjoto (2011) refer to this view as the over-investment hypothesis. Another hypothesis, due to Cespa and Cestone (2007) , states that current CEOs engage in strategic CSR in order to decrease the probability of CEO turnover in the future. The third hypothesis states that in highly competitive markets, firms tend to use CSR to differentiate themselves from competitors and to signal the quality of their products (Fisman et al., 2005; Falck and Heblich, 2007) . The final hypothesis, known as the conflict resolution hypothesis, is based on the views of Jensen (2002) , Scherer et al. (2006) and Calton and Payne (2003) , who suggest that firms use CSR activities to resolve the conflicts between managers, investing and non-investing stakeholders. In this context, we note that Harjoto and Jo (2011) assess the effects of internal (board structure and ownership concentration) and external (institutional ownership and monitoring by security analysts) governance mechanisms on the firm's choice of CSR activities. Consistent with earlier empirical evidence, the authors provide evidence consistent with CSR being positively associated with governance mechanisms such as board leadership, board independence, institutional ownership, analyst following, and antitakeover provisions. Harjoto and Jo (2012) interpret their findings as being consistent with the resolution of the agency problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) examine the relationship between CG and CSR using four governance variables: managerial ownership, independent director representation, concentrated institutional ownership, and strength of shareholder rights (i.e. the threat of takeovers). The authors hypothesize that the relationship between CG and CSR is moderated by the satisfaction with firm performance. Their findings suggest that strong CG minimizes the risks of managers endorsing negative CSR.
However, when firms perform well, the impact of governance on positive CSR is minimal, hence positive CSR is high. Furthermore, Harjoto and Jo (2011) argue that CSR engagement is positively related to effective governance mechanisms and to better firm performance through lessened agency costs and reduced conflict of interests among stakeholders. In subsequent work, Jo and Harjoto (2012) provide evidence of unidirectional causality from CG to CSR. More specifically, the authors find that a lagged measure of CG has a positive effect on CSR thereby supporting the conflict resolution hypothesis of Jensen (2002) and Scherer et al. (2006) according to which firms use CSR activities to resolve the conflicts between managers, investing and non-investing stakeholders.
The aforementioned literature offers different means to conceptualize the CG-CSR nexus and a definitive consensus is yet to emerge. Furthermore, only a limited number of studies examine the CG-CSR nexus in a developing country or banking context. In light of the paucity of research in these areas, this paper aims to address the gap in the literature by providing an in-depth qualitative examination of the CG, CSR and the CG-CSR nexus in the context of the Lebanese banking sector. A number of interesting findings emerge from our qualitative comparative study.
First, Lebanese banks and banking regulators (association) have a common understanding of the importance of CG. Second, despite the fact that both banks and banking regulators view CSR as a differentiation tool, the two parties' views differ in relation to the ulterior motive underlying CSR engagement. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the banks and banking authorities' views on the CG-CSR nexus differ substantially. While the banking authorities view CSR as an expression of a good CG framework, the majority of the banks in our sample adhere to the view that CSR embeds CG thereby giving CSR an all-encompassing role. In line with their beliefs, the banking regulators have exerted concerted efforts to ensure a sound CG framework in the Lebanese banking sector without explicitly addressing CSR.
The Lebanese Banking Sector and CG Context
The Lebanese Banking Sector: Key Characteristics
The Lebanese economy is largely reliant on its services sector which accounts for nearly 75% of [Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here]
Despite some adverse economic, political and security developments over the period, Figure 1 and Table 1 show a sustained increase in consolidated total assets of Lebanese banks. This steady growth in assets demonstrates the considerable resilience of the Lebanese banking sector.
Corporate Governance in Lebanon
Corporate Governance can be considered to be a relatively recent concept in Lebanon.
Regulators and government officials instigated the dialogue on CG only in 2004. The main challenges facing a proper implementation of CG in Lebanon are the lack of general awareness about the subject and the attachment of several stakeholders to the traditional approaches and systems of management.
In fact, small to medium sized enterprises, mostly family-owned, are the main drivers of the Lebanese economy. Family-owned businesses are characterized by having owners that are inclined to manage their corporations themselves rather than to abide by policies and procedures that are set to regulate their businesses. The management of family-owned enterprises is, for instance, seldom sensitized to the need for an independent board member. The Lebanese banking sector, whose origins can also be firmly traced to family ownership, suffers from the same lack of awareness regarding the importance of sound CG. Another main obstacle facing the implementation of sound CG principles is a weak Lebanese legal system. Table 2 provides a listing of the most important BdL directives (also known as circulars) on CG.
[Insert Table 2 here]
As evident from the list of circulars in 
Questionnaire Design and Surveyed Institutions
We employ data from two sources: (i) qualitative data collected from banks and from key banking authorities and a bank association in Lebanon and (ii) data collected from in-depth interviews that were conducted with senior managers of banks and bank regulatory institutions.
Some additional data are collected from the website of the banks comprising our sample. The first group of interviews was conducted with Lebanese authorities and regulators in order to assess the importance of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in the banking industry. The aim of these interviews is to take stock of the authorities' point of view on the relationship between CG and CSR.
The second group of interviews involved senior managers (corporate social responsibility, compliance or marketing managers) from a sample of Lebanese banks. The goal of these interviews is to examine the banks' practices in terms of CG and CSR. In specific, the interviews aim to gauge the managers' perceptions of the link between the two paradigms.
A questionnaire comprising open and close-ended questions was designed. The questionnaire, provided in full in Appendix A, is composed of three sections. The first relates to the CG mechanisms and practices employed in the sample of banks considered in our analysis. The second section investigates the CSR paradigm at the banks and the final section is designed to address the relationship between CG and CSR as suggested by Jamali et al. (2008) .
Surveyed Banks
Our survey and interviews were conducted with five Lebanese banks: Bank Audi, Bank Libano- Table 3 provides the names of the surveyed banks as well as the exact title of the surveyed manager within each bank.
[Insert Table 3 Table 4 presents a summary of Bilanbanques (2011)'s grouping.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The surveyed banks have a geographic presence in all of Lebanon and some of the banks also have foreign subsidiaries. The banks are selected based on their reputation, size (in terms of assets) and their involvement in CSR activities.
Surveyed Governmental Institutions and Bank Association
Our sample comprises five governmental entities that have a direct banking oversight role or whose mandates at the macroeconomic level can affect banks indirectly. We also survey an The BCC performs its supervisory functions as an independent body but in close coordination with BdL (who has the legal prerogative to ask for all the reports of the BCC). The BCC's functions is to supervise banks, financial institutions, money dealers, brokerage firms and leasing companies and fulfills its duties through periodic on-site and off-site examinations of the entities it supervises. Among other specific mandates, the BCC is tasked with ensuring that (i) its supervisees abide by the provisions of the Lebanese Code of Money and Credit and (ii) its supervisees abide by BdL and BCC's circulars. The final direct supervisory entity, the SIC, has a narrower mandate than BdL and BCC and is tasked with fighting money laundering.
Through its aims of developing a legal environment conducive to economic development, higher employment and greater social welfare, the Ministry of Economy and Trade (MoET) plays an important role at the macroeconomic level. Its specific mandate of consumer protection also gives the MoET an indirect supervisory role over banks. The final institution in our survey, the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL) is a non-governmental banking association which aims to strengthen cooperation among the member banks and to safeguard the interests of the banking sector. One important function undertaken by ABL is to liaise with the banking authorities regarding current and proposed regulations. ABL also promulgates legislations whose goal is to promote the banking sector.
CG and CSR from the Authorities' and Banks' Perspectives
CG from the governmental institutions and bank association's perspective
A summary of the survey responses of the four governmental institutions and the banking association regarding their CG paradigm are provided in Panel A of Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 here]
As noted earlier, Lebanese authorities made several gradual attempts to promote best practices in terms of CG. The overriding concern in the Lebanese regulators' initiatives is to familiarize
Lebanese banks with the notion of CG. It can be argued that the gradual approach that the regulators adopted is consistent with Bhasin's (2010) arguments according to which ensuring effective governance evolves gradually from the "compliance" to a "conscience" approach to CG.
The recommendations of Lebanese regulators with regards to CG are also in line with the findings of academic research highlighting the importance of adequate CG mechanisms and controls in monitoring and maintaining managerial performance. In specific, the BdL and BCC circulars, which require banks to have adequate internal control mechanisms and independent board committees, echo the recommendations of Newman (2000) and Ruigrok et al. (2006) . The previous two studies underscore the important role of non-executive directors in using objective and professional judgment to monitor managerial performance. Newman (2000) and Ruigrok et al. (2006) also note that oversight by sub-committees ensure the integrity of the financial statements.
During the interview process, the banking authorities (association) also underlined the importance of effective internal control mechanisms in facilitating regulatory oversight. This view is consistent with a sizeable strand of the literature (Solomon et al., 2000; Spira and Page 2003 and Jones, 2008 ) which emphasizes internal control as one of the most important CG mechanisms.
The views of the banking regulatory bodies and associations also suggest a clear link between good CG and financial performance. Indeed, both banks and banking authorities agree that the Lebanese banking sector cannot "afford" a weak CG and that effective CG mitigates high risks which may, in turn, cause serious losses. For instance, a banking authority interviewee states:
"we simply cannot afford a weak CG in our banking sector. From the mere fact that Lebanon depends a lot on the banking sector and that we have systemic banks in our economy that constitute the building blocks of the sector, there has to be a continuous supervision of the sector, and we, regulators, cannot be in the banks all the time to monitor all their activities. Good CG is the only thing that protects banks" while a banking sector interviewee remarks "Banks have to be very vigilant to the detrimental effects of weak corporate governance and compliance. They can be one the primary reasons for bank failure".
The previously discussed relation between CG and financial performance has been extensively studied in existing research and will be discussed, in more length, in Section 6 of the paper. The banking authorities also note that good CG in the Lebanese banking sector is poised for takeoff as banks are increasingly more integrated into international financial markets. Such integration will, in turn, further elucidate the importance that foreign investors, regulators and banking institutions place on sound CG principles and foster a greater appreciation of the benefits of good CG for Lebanese banks.
CG from the Banks' Perspective
A summary of the survey responses of the banks are provided in Panel A of Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
The survey responses reveal that there has been an increased awareness regarding the importance of CG across all the banks in our sample. In fact, the management of each of the surveyed banks demonstrates both an interest and a profound understanding of the importance of good CG.
Using Bhasin's (2010) terminology, we view this evidence as suggesting that Lebanese banks are moving from the traditional "compliance" to the "conscience" approach in implementing CG.
The survey responses also uncover that CG is a central component to the strategy and core values of each of the banks. It is important to note that all the banks in our survey dedicate a section of their website to CG and include information regarding CG as an essential component of their annual reports.
The survey responses also show that the interviewed banks were compliant with BdL's requirements on good CG. All the banks have independent and non-executive board members, audit and risk committees, adequate disclosure, and internal audit departments. In fact, a majority of the banks established more than two board committees relating to internal audit and risk thereby exceeding BdL's requirements in that respect. In addition, our interviews with managers
show that accountability and transparency are major concerns for Lebanese banks. More specifically, the responses of managers suggest that if these two elements are absent, CG will be significantly weakened and the bank's reputation and performance will be at significant risk. Our interview results also suggest that banks need to prioritize social needs and place them at the core of their business (Porter and Kramer, 2006) . These needs may belong to a variety of stakeholders such as their employees, their customers or to society at large. If applied strategically, banks will benefit from improved customer loyalty, employee retention, enhanced goodwill and, ultimately, enhanced financial performance. By doing so, banks can effectively create Porter and Kramer's (2011) shared value which is essential for effective competition and profit maximization.
The banking authorities and ABL agree that mandating CSR is unwarranted at this stage given that the focus should be on ensuring effective CG rather than forcing banks to engage in CSR. While the banking authorities believe that CSR is making important strides in the Lebanese banking sector, they note that a gradual shift which results in CSR being viewed as a strategic goal rather than a marketing tool is needed.
CSR from Banks' Perspective
The summary of the banks' survey responses on CSR, presented in Panel B of Table 6 Another interesting finding emerging from the survey responses is a common CSR focus of Lebanese banks which includes the community, the environment, people, education and health.
For instance, the surveyed banks emphasize employee training and workshops, promoting gender equality, participating in philanthropic sporting activities, giving scholarships and holding regular educational events, establishing large networks of branches, fostering partnerships with NGOs and sponsoring green initiatives. A few banks evolved from philanthropic CSR towards more strategic CSR. For example, some banks endorse international CSR initiatives such as the UN Global Compact (e.g., Fransabank), commit themselves to universal principles such as the UN Women Empowerment Principles (e.g., BLC bank that also initiated the "we-initiative" supporting the same cause), or take part in the pilot program for ISO 26000 (e.g., Audi and Blom bank). Other strategic CSR goals include aiming at educating the youth and developing products and services that are believed to be beneficial for society (e.g., micro credit lending developed by Fransabank). Finally, one bank has also extended its CSR environmentally friendly initiatives to its value chain by applying the equator principles with its suppliers and clients.
In sum, all the banks in our sample are currently practicing philanthropic (or altruistic) CSR by voluntarily engaging in social activities (Carroll, 1979; Lantos, 2001 ). However, some banks are also involved in certain aspects of strategic CSR whereby banks' incentives of reaping financial benefits coincide with the welfare of stakeholders (Lantos, 2001 ). The banks' main objective from engaging in CSR is to give back to their community. Only two banks view promoting economic development in the country as part of their CSR objectives. Consistent with existing research (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Jo and Harjoto, 2011) , the summary of the banks'
responses on their CSR paradigm also suggest that banks view CSR as means through which to build a better reputation, enhance corporate image and differentiate themselves from competitors. Two banks firmly stated that CSR and enhanced financial performance are linked to each other while others believed that this relationship is only supported by strategic CSR.
Overall, our analysis also suggests that Lebanese banks did not reach the level of a fullfledged strategic CSR which entails the fulfillment of specific philanthropic responsibilities that simultaneously benefit the bottom line (Lantos, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2006) .
The CG-CSR Nexus in the Lebanese Banking Industry
The CG-CSR Nexus from the Banking Authorities' Perspective
The summary of the banking authorities' and ABL responses in relation to the CG-CSR nexus are presented in Panel C of Table 5 . Consistent with a strand of the existing research (Luo, 2006) , the banking authorities view CSR as an integral component of good CG. The banking authorities' views lend credence to the second pillar of the CG-CSR nexus advocated by Jamali et al. (2008) according to which CSR is a dimension of an overall CG framework.
In fact, according to BCC and BdL, CSR represents an external expression of a good CG system (Strandberg, 2005) . For instance, a banking authority interviewee voiced the following opinion: "CSR comes as an extension to CG. Banks should start by setting their global strategy by identifying the rights of their different stakeholders and by setting the adequate rules and procedures that respect these rights and ensure accountability". The same interviewee also notes that: "when you have a good CG framework, you are assumed to have a well-defined strategy and all of your activities will subsequently flow from it. CSR would then be strategic and wellimplemented". The clearest expression of the view that CSR follows from the overall CG framework comes another banking authority representative who stated that "In my opinion, CG is a whole. My target is good CG and it allows me to do CSR". The views expressed by the Lebanese banking authorities therefore contradict a strand of research (Fassin and Van Rossem; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Basu and Palazzo, 2008) which advocates CSR as an allencompassing concept. According to the banking authorities, banks should, at a first stage, define their global strategy by taking into account the rights of their different stakeholders and setting the adequate rules and procedures that safeguard these rights.
In line with Harjoto (2011, 2012) , the banking authorities echo the view that there is a positive relationship between CSR and financial performance. As a case in point, a banking authority interviewee notes that "If I was good to the community, the community will give back with goodness. If I am good to the environment, it may cost me a little at the beginning but then it will impact me positively" while another banking authority interviewee states that "CSR gives a good corporate image. A good image is publicity and that is good for business". Consistent with the prior views, a third banking authority interviewee remarks "Banks in Lebanon tend to use CSR as a marketing tool. In other words, they use CSR to differentiate themselves and gain clients' confidence in the hope of achieving better financial performance".
The CG-CSR Nexus from Banks' Perspective
A number of interesting findings regarding the CG-CSR nexus emerge from the summary of the banks' interview responses presented in Panel C of Table 6 . First, all interviewees recognize that CG and CSR are not two distinct concepts and that an overlap exists between them. Second, in contrast to the banking authorities' views, three out of the five banks give CSR the umbrella attribute. For instance, a banking sector interviewee expresses the view that "there is certainly a relationship between CG and CSR. A solid CG is part of CSR. I also think that effective CG can affect CSR" while the interviewee from another bank states "CG is a component in the main frame of CSR. None are bigger than the other but I would argue that CSR has the umbrella attribute and CG comes first". The latter view is congruent with Jamali et al. Our survey results and interviews also suggest that Lebanese bank managers adhere to the view that CSR positively affects financial performance and indicate that they tend to view CSR as a strategic differentiator or a marketing tool. For example, one interviewee notes that "CSR results in bank having a good reputation and a good reputation contributes to image building and good marketing. Of course, all of this results in higher profits in the long-run". Interestingly, while the other interviewed bank managers shared the view that CSR engagement might result in improved financial performance, they did not, contrary to the bank authorities and regulators' assertions, explicitly refer to the use CSR as a marketing tool.
Discussion of Findings
Comparative Analysis of CG: Authorities vs. Banks' Perspective
Our findings suggest that the Lebanese banking sector is abreast of the importance of good CG and has adopted, largely because of the banking authorities' directives, good CG principles. The comparison of the two perspectives of CG (authorities' vs. banks' perspective) shows that conviction plays an integral role when adopting good CG. However, banking regulators and supervisors need to continue their efforts in terms of monitoring banks' implementation of CG.
Our findings also reveal that banks and banking authorities appreciate the importance of balancing the interests of all stakeholders when making decisions. Having CG embedded in the core values of the institution certainly serves this end. Tables 5 and 6 show that the interviewed parties unanimously agree that CG has a promising future in Lebanon but they also note the difficulties in implementing CG outside the confines of the banking sector due to the familyowned nature of Lebanese corporations. Our interview results therefore suggest that further effort should be directed at educating family-owned businesses about the advantages of sound CG. Given the extensive efforts that the BCC and BdL exert in promoting a culture of good CG, it is very likely for the culture of sound CG to persist and evolve.
Comparative Analysis of CSR: Authorities vs. Banks' Perspective
A comparison between the banking authorities' and banks' views on CSR uncovers a number of similarities. Both parties agree that CSR activities serve to differentiate the bank from competitors and enhance financial performance. Nonetheless, the banking authorities and banks disagree on the ultimate motive behind CSR. While banking authorities view banks' CSR engagement as a marketing tool, bank managers note that their motive in undertaking CSR activities is to give back to the community. The banking authorities and bank association's views are consistent with Barnea and Rubin's (2010) arguments according to which top managers have a tendency to over-invest in CSR in order to build an image as good citizens. The findings also support Jo and Harjoto (2011) who contend that, in today's highly competitive markets, firms tend to use CSR to differentiate themselves from competitors. The two parties share the view that CSR in Lebanon is poised for a brighter future and that strategic CSR activities will dominate the banks' engagement agenda in the long-run. While banking authorities overwhelmingly agree that, unlike CG, CSR should not be mandated (Panel B of Table 5 ), two bank managers' reactions to mandating CSR was positive. In addition, the responses in Panel B of Tables 5 and 6 indicate both banking authorities' and banks' representatives (with the exception of one bank)
broadly agree view CSR engagement as conducive to good financial performance. However, the banking authorities' opinions were communicated much more forcefully than the banks'.
Comparative Analysis of the CG-CSR Nexus
Our comparative analysis of the banks and banking authorities' views on the CG-CSR nexus reveals a number of differences. While both parties agree that the two concepts are related, they disagree in their definition of the nature of this relationship. First, the banking authorities as well as one bank consider CSR as a part of CG whereas the other banks believed that CG is part of the CSR. Second, whereas the banking authorities affirm that effective CG affects CSR investments and that effective governance can cause CSR, the evidence from the banks' survey responses did not support this hypothesis. Third, while authorities firmly state that firm performance and availability of resources affect CSR investments, the surveyed banks did not unanimously agree.
It is important to note that both banks and banking authorities believe that CG and CSR can positively affect the financial performance of the firm. These latter views are consistent with the conclusions drawn from prior empirical research on financial performance and CG/CSR.
More specifically, the existing empirical research (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Yermack 1996, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel, 2009; Chhaochharia and Grisstein 2007; Ammann, Oesch and Schmid, 2011 ) suggests a positive relationship between good CG and firm value. 6 In the prior studies, CG is measured using several metrics. Yermack (1996) A parallel strand of the financial economics literature argues that a more extensive CSR engagement is associated with a lower cost of debt (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, Mishra, 2011;
Oikonomou, Brooks and Pavelin, 2014) and a better credit rating (Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Suh, 2013) . The views expressed by the banks and banking authorities, according to which CSR engagement leads to better financial performance, therefore concur with conclusions of the prior studies. It also lends credence to the banking authorities' view that CSR is used by banks as a differentiator.
Conclusions and Limitations and Future Research
This paper studies the CG-CSR nexus in the context of the Lebanese banking sector using a qualitative comparative study of the opinions of Lebanese bank managers, banking authorities and a bank association. Our findings reveal that disagreements exist between the Lebanese banks and banking authorities in defining the CG-CSR nexus. While CG is viewed as an allencompassing concept by the banking authorities, most banks ascribe to the paradigm that CG is component of CSR.
Our results have several implications for the understanding and practice of CSR and CG in the Lebanese banking sector. First, our findings suggest that the culture of sound CG in the Lebanese banking sector is likely to persist and evolve in view of the continued efforts of the banking regulators in promoting CG as well as the strong belief of banking sector representatives in the importance of CG. Second, our results indicate that CSR is not likely to be mandated in the Lebanese banking sector.
Our results also shed light on the understanding of CG and CSR in the Lebanese banking sector. For instance, the culture of having an extended CSR model that targets all stakeholders is not yet actively promoted by banking authorities. In fact, the Lebanese banking authorities did not explicitly allude to CSR in their directives even though bank managers appear to be abreast of the concept of CSR and its importance.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine the CG-CSR nexus for a larger sample of Lebanese banks and corporations Ideally, the cross-section of firms should not be confined to the banking sector and should span service providers, manufacturers, small to medium size enterprises and family-owned businesses. Such a sample would allow us to test, for example, whether family-owned firms are more reluctant to institute CG principles. (1) CG as a pillar for CSR, (2) CSR as a dimension of CG, and (3) CG and CSR as part of a continuum? 17-Do you believe that firm performance affects CSR investment? 18-Do you think that the availability of resources (positive slack) affects CSR investment?
